NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 9 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ISIDRO CARLON-BONILLA, No. 18-73101 Petitioner, Agency No. A098-251-511 v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted October 6, 2020** Seattle, Washington Before: CALLAHAN and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,*** District Judge. Isidro Carlon-Bonilla petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmance of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)’s order finding Carlon- * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. Bonilla ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) for having been convicted of an aggravated felony.1 Carlon-Bonilla was convicted of second degree arson under Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.48.030(1), which criminalizes “knowingly and maliciously caus[ing] a fire or explosion which damages a building . . . .” Carlon-Bonilla contends that his conviction for second degree arson is not an aggravated felony because the Washington statute is not a categorical match to the relevant federal arson statute. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we review de novo the legal question whether an offense is an aggravated felony for removal purposes. See Chavez-Solis v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1004, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015). For the reasons set forth below, we deny Carlon-Bonilla’s petition for review. An alien convicted of an “aggregated felony” is ineligible for cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) defines the term “aggravated felony” to cover, inter alia, an offense described in the federal arson statute at 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(E)(i). That arson statute criminalizes “maliciously damag[ing] or destroy[ing], or attempt[ing] to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building . . . .” To determine whether second degree arson under the Washington statute is an aggravated felony under the INA, we apply the categorical approach from Taylor v. 1 Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we restate only those necessary to explain our decision. 2 United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) and its progeny. Ordinarily, “[a] state statute is a categorical match to the generic federal statute if it proscribes the same amount of or less conduct than the federal statute.” United States v. Hernandez, 769 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2014). Even where the state statute “sweeps more broadly than [the] federal statute,” it may still be a categorical match where “there is no realistic probability . . . that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime.” Id. (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas–Alvarez, 549 U.S. ...
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