NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________ No. 20-2538 ___________ ISRAEL JUAREZ-GARCIA, a/k/a Israel Juarez, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ____________ On Petition for Review from an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board No. A206-705-061) Immigration Judge: Steven A. Morley ____________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) June 23, 2021 Before: Chief Judge SMITH, MATEY, FISHER, Circuit Judges. (Filed: August 27, 2021) ____________ OPINION* ____________ FISHER, Circuit Judge. * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Petitioner Israel Juarez-Garcia, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of a final order of removal by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).1 An immigration judge denied his request for cancellation of removal under a special rule for battered spouses.2 The BIA upheld that denial, affirming the IJ’s determination that removal would not result in extreme hardship. Juarez-Garcia argues that the IJ relied on an incorrect legal standard and that the IJ and BIA should have considered evidence related to mental health in evaluating his credibility. Because we conclude that our jurisdiction to consider these claims is lacking, we will dismiss Juarez-Garcia’s petition. The Attorney General may cancel removal of an alien who has been “battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a [U.S. citizen] spouse,”3 provided the alien meets certain criteria and shows that removal would cause him “extreme hardship.”4 Grant or denial of such relief is generally within the agency’s discretion.5 The INA does not define “extreme hardship”6 for purposes of evaluating applications for cancellation of removal, 1 In general, we have jurisdiction to review final orders of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). However, as explained below, that jurisdiction does not extend to the review of discretionary decisions granting or denying cancellation of removal. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(B). Because Juarez-Garcia challenges the agency’s discretionary denial of cancellation of removal and does not raise any colorable constitutional or legal claim, see id. § 1252(a)(2)(D), we do not have jurisdiction here. 2 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(I). 3 Id. 4 Id. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(v). 5 See id. § 1229b(b)(2)(A) (Attorney General “may” grant cancellation of removal). 6 Id. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(v). 2 and does not otherwise “provide[] a legal standard for determining its existence.”7 Accordingly, in the cancellation context, a “hardship determination is discretionary”8 and “we lack jurisdiction over [such] decisions.”9 Our jurisdiction extends only to the review of “colorable” constitutional or legal claims.10 “To determine whether a claim is colorable, we ask whether it is immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.”11 Here, Juarez-Garcia advances a purportedly legal claim, arguing that the IJ and BIA applied an “improper legal standard” in evaluating whether he would face extreme hardship.12 But on closer inspection, this argument is only an attempt to obtain jurisdiction.13 Juarez-Garcia contends that the IJ ignored evidence regarding his mental health—evidence he says bore on the extreme hardship analysis. …
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