NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 19 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT ISRAEL MARTINEZ-CORONA, No. 19-72569 Petitioner, Agency No. A216-474-777 v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney MEMORANDUM* General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted October 6, 2021 Seattle, Washington Before: PAEZ, M. SMITH, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges Petitioner Israel Martinez-Corona seeks review of a Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision affirming an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his application for cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2). We dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. The parties’ familiarity with the record is assumed. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision on the basis that Martinez-Corona did not merit cancellation of removal as a matter of discretion. Consequently, we have jurisdiction to consider the petition for review only to the extent that it raises colorable constitutional or other legal questions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), (D); Monroy v. Lynch, 821 F.3d 1175, 1177 (9th Cir. 2016). Rather than presenting a colorable legal question, Martinez-Corona’s challenges to the agencies’ adverse credibility finding are factual disputes that we lack jurisdiction to entertain. See Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1694 (2020); Vilchiz-Soto v. Holder, 688 F.3d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 2014) (“adverse credibility determinations” are “factual findings”). Martinez-Corona’s arguments that the BIA should have “directly addressed the IJ’s adverse credibility determination” and that the BIA failed to cite any “standard [or] legal guidance” do not raise colorable legal questions because the BIA did both. It cited the correct standard for its review of an IJ’s adverse credibility finding—clear error, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)— and its explanation of how that standard applied to the record before it, while brief, was adequate. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2010). We do have jurisdiction to consider whether the BIA acted “contrary to law” by violating its own precedents. Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 829 (9th 2 Cir. 2003). Even so, we deny on the merits Martinez-Corona’s claim that BIA precedent made it improper for the IJ to consider police reports relating to his arrest for domestic battery and false imprisonment, which has so far not resulted in a conviction.1 In Matter of Thomas, 21 I. & N. Dec. 20 (BIA 1995), the BIA held that evidence of criminal conduct may be considered in some circumstances even without a later conviction, and that the weight given to such evidence depends on the facts and circumstances. See id. at 23-24; see also Matter of Teixeira, 21 I. & N. Dec. 316, 321 (BIA 1996). The BIA cited and applied the Thomas standard in determining that the IJ’s use of the police reports here …
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