PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 20−1363 JEAN FRANCOIS PUGIN, Petitioner, v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Argued: March 9, 2021 Decided: November 30, 2021 Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, AGEE, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Richardson wrote the opinion, in which Judge Agee joined. Chief Judge Gregory wrote a dissenting opinion. ARGUED: Martha Hutton, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Margot Pyne Kniffin, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Brian D. Doyle, Julio Pereyra, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Neiman-Kelting, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge: Jean Francois Pugin is a lawful permanent resident facing deportation. The government decided to deport Pugin after he was found guilty of being an accessory after the fact under Virginia law. That conviction, the government contends, permits Pugin to be deported under the Immigration and Nationality Act for having committed an “aggravated felony,” namely one “relating to . . . the obstruction of justice.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). Pugin disagrees, claiming that an accessory-after-the-fact conviction under Virginia law does not categorically qualify under the Act as one “relating to obstruction of justice.” We agree with the government that it does. We first find that the Board of Immigration Appeals’ definition of “obstruction of justice” under the Act is due Chevron deference. Finding Chevron deference must be given, we then find that the Virginia offense of accessory after the fact categorically matches the Board’s definition. So we affirm the Board’s finding that Pugin may be deported under the Act. I. Background Jean Francois Pugin, a native and citizen of Mauritius, was admitted to the United States in 1985 as a lawful permanent resident. In 2014, Pugin pleaded guilty in Virginia to being an accessory after the fact to a felony. He was sentenced to twelve months imprisonment with nine months suspended. Pugin was then issued a notice to appear charging him with removability because he was convicted of an aggravated felony: “an offense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury, or subornation of perjury.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 2 1101(a)(43)(S), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 1 Pugin moved to terminate proceedings before the immigration judge, asserting that he was not removable because his conviction was not an aggravated felony. The immigration judge explained that the categorical approach is the proper form of analysis to determine whether Virginia accessory after the fact qualifies as obstruction of justice. Employing that approach, the immigration judge noted that the Board had previously decided that a federal conviction for accessory after the fact under Section 3 of Title 18 2 is a crime relating to obstruction of justice. See In re Batista-Hernandez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 955, 961 (B.I.A. 1997). Turning to whether Virginia’s version of that offense also qualified, …
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