NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _____________ No. 18-1783 _____________ JERMAINE LAJUAN KERR, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Respondent ______________ On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A059-127-018) Immigration Judge: Honorable Kuyomars Golparvar ______________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a): March 5, 2019 ______________ Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, AMBRO and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges. (Opinion Filed: May 21, 2019) ______________ OPINION * ______________ * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent. RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Jermaine LaJuan Kerr seeks review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which dismissed his appeal of an order of removal entered by the Immigration Court. While Kerr advances several arguments in support of his Petition, he advanced none of these arguments in support of his appeal to the BIA. Therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 places restrictions on the jurisdiction of this Court to review final orders of removal. As relevant to this case, the Act provides that the Court may review final orders of removal only if “the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). This statutory provision “require[s] an alien ‘to raise or exhaust his or her remedies as to each claim or ground for relief [before the BIA] if he or she is to preserve the right of judicial review of that claim.’” Hoxha v. Holder, 559 F.3d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 595 (3d Cir.2003)). This statutory exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional. Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 245 n.8 (3d Cir. 2004). In support of his Petition, Kerr advances three arguments: (1) the Immigration Court should have granted Kerr a continuance to afford him a reasonable opportunity to confer with his retained counsel, who allegedly provided ineffective assistance because Kerr may have been entitled to forms of relief that his counsel did not pursue, see Petitioner Br. 11–21; (2) the Immigration Court should have granted Kerr a continuance to afford his 2 retained counsel, who allegedly “babys[a]t Mr. Kerr for an afternoon,” an adequate opportunity to prepare to challenge the Government’s production of evidence that Kerr had committed either an “aggravated felony” or a “particularly serious crime” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A) and 1231(b)(3)(B), respectively, id. at 29; and (3) the Government failed to demonstrate that Kerr had been convicted of an aggravated felony, see id. at 29–38. The sole issue that Kerr presented in his brief in support of his appeal to the BIA, however, was whether “the Immigration Judge err[ed] in his decision to deny [Kerr]’s application for withholding and request for deferral . . . under the Convention Against Torture, holding that [Kerr] ...
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