FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JESUS RAMIREZ-MEDINA, AKA No. 16-73325 Javier Gonzalez, Petitioner, Agency No. A079-811-177 v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney OPINION General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted November 18, 2021 Pasadena, California Filed December 22, 2021 Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges, and Stephen R. Bough, * District Judge. Opinion by Judge Hurwitz * The Honorable Stephen R. Bough, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri, sitting by designation. 2 RAMIREZ-MEDINA V. GARLAND SUMMARY ** Immigration Denying Jesus Ramirez-Medina’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the panel held that the phrase “an offense” in the cancellation of removal statute at 8 U.S.C § 1229b(b)(1)(C) includes the “[m]ultiple criminal convictions” described in § 1182(a)(2)(B). Under 8 U.S.C § 1229b(b)(1)(C), an alien who has been “been convicted of an offense under [8 U.S.C.] section 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3)” is ineligible for cancellation of removal. The BIA concluded that Ramirez was ineligible for cancellation because he was removable under § 1182(a)(2)(B), which covers aliens who have been “convicted of 2 or more offenses . . . for which the aggregate sentences to confinement were 5 years or more.” Ramirez contended that because the statutory disqualification in § 1229b(b)(1)(C) is phrased in the singular, his multiple offenses described in § 1182(a)(2)(B) did not trigger ineligibility for cancellation. The panel disagreed, relying on Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 649 (9th Cir. 2004), in which this court concluded that the most logical reading of § 1229b(b)(1)(C) was that the cancellation bar applies to each of the disqualifying events “described under” the cross-referenced provisions. The panel concluded that the same logic applied here and that § 1229b(b)(1)(C)’s use of the singular “offense” did not ** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. RAMIREZ-MEDINA V. GARLAND 3 require a different conclusion. The panel explained that the Dictionary Act generally instructs that “words importing the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things.” 1 U.S.C. § 1. The panel also observed that its interpretation accorded with that of the Fifth Circuit. Ramirez also argued that the BIA erred in finding that his multiple convictions resulted in aggregated sentences of at least five years because the agency relied on a criminal record that he alleged did not relate to him. The panel rejected that argument, explaining that the agency reasonably concluded that Ramirez did not satisfy his burden of showing that he had not been convicted of an offense that made him ineligible for cancellation. COUNSEL Matthew Lorn Hoppock (argued), Hoppock Law Firm LLC, Shawnee, Kansas, for Petitioner. Timothy G. Hayes (argued), Trial Attorney; Andrew N. O’Malley, Senior Litigation Counsel; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent. 4 RAMIREZ-MEDINA V. GARLAND …
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