Jose Ortiz Narez v. Merrick Garland


FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JOSE ANTONIO ORTIZ NAREZ, Nos. 19-72039 Petitioner, 20-71416 v. Agency No. A013-623-921 MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. OPINION On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted December 6, 2021 Pasadena, California Filed February 16, 2022 Before: Milan D. Smith, Jr., Kenneth K. Lee, and Danielle J. Forrest, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Lee 2 ORTIZ NAREZ V. GARLAND SUMMARY * Immigration Denying Jose Ortiz Narez’s petition for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, the panel held that voluntary manslaughter under California law qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT). Ortiz entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident, but was later found removable on the ground that he committed two CIMTs not arising out of single scheme of conduct. Ortiz contended that his conviction for voluntary manslaughter under California Penal Code (CPC) § 192(a) was not a CIMT. Applying the categorical approach, the panel first explained that California defines voluntary manslaughter as the “unlawful killing of a human being without malice . . . upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” CPC § 192(a). In turn, the California Supreme Court has construed the statute as requiring some form of culpable mental state—an intent to kill or a conscious disregard for life. Second, the panel compared CPC § 192(a) to the federal definition of a CIMT, which this court has defined as involving either fraud or base, vile, and depraved conduct that shocks the public conscience. The panel explained that the court considers the requisite state of mind as well as the resulting harm in tandem; as the level of conscious behavior decreases (i.e., from intentional to reckless conduct), more * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. ORTIZ NAREZ V. GARLAND 3 serious resulting harm is required to find that the crime involves moral turpitude. Thus, a crime committed only recklessly requires a more serious harm to qualify as a CIMT. Here, the panel agreed with the BIA that CPC § 192(a) is a CIMT, explaining that the statute only requires recklessness, but the harm—the unlawful killing of a human—stands at the apex. The panel rejected Ortiz’s other claims in a separate memorandum disposition. COUNSEL Erika Vejar (argued), Vejar Law Firm, San Dimas, California, for Petitioner. Kristen H. Blosser (argued), Trial Attorney; Anthony P. Nicastro, Assistant Director; Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. OPINION LEE, Circuit Judge: Under federal immigration law, a non-citizen may be removed from the country if he has been convicted of a “crime involving moral turpitude” (CIMT). 8 U.S.C § 1227(a)(2)(A). The question before us is whether voluntary manslaughter under California law qualifies as a CIMT. We hold that it does because voluntary manslaughter requires the defendant …

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