NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 10 2022 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JOSE LUIS VAZQUEZ-ARDON, No. 20-73148 Petitioner, Agency No. A206-836-726 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted January 13, 2022 Pasadena, California Before: CLIFTON and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and S. MURPHY, III, ** District Judge. Petitioner Jose Vazquez-Ardon seeks review of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) reasonable fear of persecution and torture findings, which the IJ made in the course of reviewing an asylum officer’s adverse reasonable fear determination * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Stephen Joseph Murphy, III, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation. during expedited reinstatement of removal order proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.31, 241.8. We review an IJ’s reasonable fear of persecution or torture findings for substantial evidence. Bartolome v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 811 (9th Cir. 2018). And we review questions of law de novo. Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917, 933 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm the IJ’s persecution finding, and we reverse and remand for the IJ to apply the correct legal standard to Petitioner’s Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) claim. For the persecution claim, substantial evidence supported the IJ’s finding that Petitioner lacked a reasonable fear of persecution. Petitioner safely relocated within El Salvador for four years. “An applicant is ineligible for asylum if the evidence establishes that ‘the applicant could avoid persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s country of nationality . . . if under all the circumstances it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.’” Kaiser v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 653, 659 (9th Cir. 2004) (ellipsis in original) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(ii)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(ii). But the IJ applied the wrong legal standard to Petitioner’s CAT claim. The IJ concluded that Petitioner “has not shown it is more likely than not he would be tortured in El Salvador.” And the IJ cited the burden of proof for the “more likely than not” standard under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Under a “more likely than not standard,” Petitioner must show “a greater than fifty percent chance of torture.” 2 Edu v. Holder, 624 F.3d 1137, 1145 n.16 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Yet, at the present stage, Petitioner need only show a “reasonable possibility” of torture, 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.31(c), 1208.31(c), which is “a ten percent chance that the non- citizen will be . . . tortured if returned to his or her home country.” Alvarado- Herrera v. Garland, 993 F.3d 1187, 1195 (9th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). Because the IJ applied the wrong legal standard, we are required to remand for further proceedings. See Lopez v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 799, 806 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a remand …
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