United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 18-1614 ___________________________ Juan Jose Inzunza Reyna, lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner, v. William P. Barr, Attorney General of the United States,1 lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent. ____________ Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals ____________ Submitted: May 15, 2019 Filed: August 29, 2019 ____________ Before COLLOTON, MELLOY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. ____________ COLLOTON, Circuit Judge. Juan Inzunza Reyna, a citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals that he is ineligible for cancellation of removal 1 Attorney General Barr is substituted for his predecessor under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2). because he sustained a prior conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude. We agree with the Board and therefore deny the petition. Reyna entered the United States from Mexico illegally in 1998. In September 2008, he pleaded guilty to theft by receiving stolen property, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-517 (1977). The Nebraska statute declares that “[a] person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of stolen movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has been stolen, unless the property is received, retained, or disposed with intention to restore it to the owner.” Id. § 28-517. Reyna’s theft by receiving offense was a Class I misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year of imprisonment. See id. § 28-106(1). The government commenced removal proceedings against Reyna in 2008. Reyna conceded removability but applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. An immigration judge denied the application, and the Board dismissed Reyna’s administrative appeal. The Board concluded that Reyna was ineligible for cancellation of removal because his Nebraska theft by receiving offense was categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. See id. §§ 1229b(b)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). Reyna disputes that conclusion, and we review the Board’s legal determination de novo. See Gomez-Gutierrez v. Lynch, 811 F.3d 1053, 1058 (8th Cir. 2016). As a threshold matter, Reyna contends that neither the immigration judge nor the Board had subject matter jurisdiction over his removal proceedings, because the initial notice to appear served on Reyna did not include information about when and where to appear. We recently rejected the same argument in Ali v. Barr, 924 F.3d 983, 986 (8th Cir. 2019), and Reyna’s preliminary contention is foreclosed by that decision. -2- The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that an alien who is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude is ineligible for cancellation of removal where the offense is punishable by a sentence of one year or longer. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(b)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i); Pereida v. Barr, 916 F.3d 1128, 1133 n.2 (8th Cir. 2019). Congress did not define “crime involving moral turpitude,” and we have accepted the Board’s interpretation that such crimes require conduct that is “inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to society in general.” Pereida, 916 F.3d at 1131 (internal quotation omitted). At ...
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