Juvenal Garcia Gonzalez v. Merrick Garland


NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 5 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JUVENAL GARCIA GONZALEZ, AKA No. 19-71043 Juvanal Gonzalez, Agency No. A092-736-474 Petitioner, v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney MEMORANDUM* General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted March 4, 2021** San Francisco, California Before: BALDOCK,*** WARDLAW, and BERZON, Circuit Judges. Juvenal Garcia Gonzalez petitions for the review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Bobby R. Baldock, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation. 1 decision denying (1) his motion to terminate and (2) his applications for a waiver of inadmissibility and adjustment of status. Exercising jurisdiction to the extent allowed under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), we deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review. 1. Petitioner first contends the BIA lacked jurisdiction over the removal proceedings because the Notice to Appear (“NTA”) did not specify the name of the court in which the NTA was to be filed. We review the sufficiency of the NTA de novo. Kohli v. Gonzalez, 473 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2007). Omitting the time, date, or place from an NTA does not deprive the immigration court of jurisdiction. See Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, 958 F.3d 887, 895 (9th Cir. 2020). Accordingly, we deny Petitioner’s claim that the BIA lacked jurisdiction over his removal proceedings. 2. Petitioner next argues the BIA erred in concluding that his assault conviction under California Penal Code § 245(a)(2) constitutes an aggravated felony crime of violence. We review de novo whether an offense qualifies as an aggravated felony crime of violence. See United States v. Grajeda, 581 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2009). We have held that a conviction “under California Penal Code § 245(a)(2) is categorically a ‘crime of violence’ and an ‘aggravated felony’ for immigration purposes.” United States v. Heron-Salinas, 566 F.3d 898, 899 (9th Cir. 2009) (per 2 curiam). While Petitioner contends that our decision in Heron-Salinas is clearly irreconcilable with Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013), we have since reaffirmed our conclusion that California assault is a categorical crime of violence. See United States v. Vasquez-Gonzalez, 901 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2018). Though Vasquez-Gonzalez addressed California Penal Code § 245(a)(1), the difference between § 245(a)(1) and (a)(2) is immaterial to the “crime of violence” analysis. The two subsections “proscribe the same conduct, the only difference being the type of weapon involved.” Heron-Salinas, 566 F.3d at 899. We therefore deny Petitioner’s claim that his assault conviction under California Penal Code § 245(a)(2) does not constitute an aggravated felony …

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