NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 30 2021 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT KAREN MANTACHIAN, No. 18-70497 18-73456 Petitioner, Agency No. A201-194-210 v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney MEMORANDUM* General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted November 18, 2021 Pasadena, California Before: LINN,** BYBEE, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges. Karen Mantachian is a native of Armenia and a citizen of Denmark. He petitions for review of two consolidated decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA dismissed Mantachian’s appeal from the denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Richard Linn, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation. (“CAT”) relief. The BIA later denied Mantachian’s motion to reopen. Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here, except as necessary to provide context to our ruling. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny both petitions. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Mantachian abandoned his applications for relief and the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) adverse credibility determination that the BIA adopted. See Budiono v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2016) (factual findings); Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010) (adverse credibility determinations). Under this standard, we uphold the agency’s findings “unless the evidence compels a contrary result.” Budiono, 837 F.3d at 1046 (citation omitted). The BIA found that Mantachian abandoned his applications for relief by leaving the United States without obtaining advance parole and then failing to provide “sufficient explanations to overcome the presumption of abandonment.” “An applicant who leaves the United States without first obtaining advance parole under § 212.5(f) of this chapter shall be presumed to have abandoned his or her application under this section.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.8(a).1 By using the word 1 The BIA also correctly rejected Mantachian’s argument that the regulation does not apply to him, finding that his second asylum application was a continuation of his first. See In re M-A-F-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 651, 655 (B.I.A. 2015) (“[A] subsequent application that merely clarifies or slightly alters the initial claim will generally not be considered a new application.”). 2 “presumed,” the regulation allows for the possibility of rebutting the presumption. See United States v. Black, 512 F.2d 864, 868 n.7 (9th Cir. 1975) (discussing the meaning of a legal presumption). Here, such rebuttal evidence would need to show the intent of retaining a claim of right or some interest. Cf. A & W Smelter & Refiners, Inc. v. Clinton, 146 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[Abandonment is] a term with a rich common law tradition. Property is abandoned when the owner intends to divest himself of all interest …
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