NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT __________ No. 21-2099 __________ KARIM DAOUD MAHMOUD SALEM, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA __________ On Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A098-493-273) Immigration Judge: Mirlande Tadal __________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on March 15, 2022 Before: JORDAN, KRAUSE, and PORTER, Circuit Judges (Filed: March 18, 2022) __________ OPINION* __________ * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Karim Ahmed Daoud Mahmoud Salem, a native and citizen of Egypt, petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. For the reasons set forth below, we will deny the petition. I. DISCUSSION1 Salem contends that the BIA erred in declining (1) to excuse his non-compliance with the requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) in view of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC); (2) to reopen his case sua sponte; and (3) to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction based on a defective Notice to Appear (NTA) under Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018). None of these arguments is persuasive. First, Salem argues that the BIA erred in denying his motion to reopen as time- and number-barred because, although it was a successive motion to reopen2 and was filed 1 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b) and 1240.15, and we exercise jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen under the highly deferential abuse of discretion standard. See Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004). This means we will reverse the BIA’s denial only if it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Rranci v. Att’y Gen., 540 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted). However, questions of law, such as a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, are reviewed de novo. See Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 153–54 (3d Cir. 2007). 2 Salem filed two motions prior to this one. The first, filed on August 9, 2010, was styled as a motion to reopen, but the BIA construed it as a motion to reconsider because it presented no new facts or evidence but instead argued only that the Board erred in its prior decision. The second, which he filed on February 25, 2011, was conversely labeled a motion to reconsider, but the Board construed it as a motion to reopen because it sought to introduce new evidence. It is immaterial for purposes of this appeal whether we consider 2 many years after the 90-day deadline, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7), equitable tolling was warranted in view of the alleged ineffective assistance of his prior counsel. Specifically, he contends that he was prejudiced by prior counsel’s failure to communicate the consequences of the voluntary departure order entered against …
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