Karina Gomez-Figueroa v. Merrick Garland


NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 14 2022 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT KARINA MARICELA GOMEZ- No. 20-72670 FIGUEROA; LESLI FRANCHESCA VASQUEZ-GOMEZ, Agency Nos. A206-804-098 A206-804-099 Petitioners, v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted March 10, 2022 San Francisco, California Before: WALLACE, S.R. THOMAS, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges. Karina Maricela Gomez-Figueroa and her daughter1 petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision denying Gomez-Figueroa’s application for asylum. Gomez-Figueroa argues that she qualifies for asylum due to persecution * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 1 Karina Maricela Gomez-Figueroa’s minor daughter is included as a derivative beneficiary of Gomez-Figueroa’s asylum application. on the basis of her membership in the particular social group of “female victims of domestic violence in El Salvador unable to leave a relationship.” We have appellate jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.2 We review the Board’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Under the substantial evidence standard, the “administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see Bringas-Rodriguez, 850 F.3d at 1059. We deny the petition for review. To establish eligibility for asylum, Gomez-Figueroa must show that she was unable or unwilling to return to El Salvador “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); see Khup v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2004). An asylum claim based upon membership in a particular social group requires that the applicant “demonstrat[e] the existence of a cognizable particular social group,” “[her] membership in that particular social group,” and “a risk of persecution on 2 We lack jurisdiction over any challenge to the immigration judge’s denial of withholding of removal or relief under the Convention Against Torture because Gomez-Figueroa did not exhaust those claims before the Board. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). 2 account of [her] membership in the specified particular social group.” Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1132 n.3 (9th Cir. 2016). Gomez-Figueroa claimed that she was persecuted on account of being “a female victim of domestic violence in El Salvador unable to leave a relationship.” The immigration judge held that Gomez-Figueroa’s proposed particular social group was not cognizable, citing Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) (A-B- I). The immigration judge further found that even if Gomez-Figueroa’s proposed particular social group was cognizable, she did not demonstrate membership in the group. The Board upheld the immigration judge’s decision that Gomez-Figueroa’s proposed particular social group was not cognizable, citing A- B- I, and held that even if the group were …

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