PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 20-1192 KATHERIN ESCARLETH MEJIA-VELASQUEZ, a/k/a Katherin Esarleth Mejia- Velasquez, Petitioner, v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. No. 20-1628 KATHERIN ESCARLETH MEJIA-VELASQUEZ, a/k/a Katherin Esarleth Mejia- Velasquez, Petitioner, v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petitions for Review of Orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Argued: December 8, 2021 Decided: February 15, 2022 Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges. Decisions affirmed and petitions for review denied by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Judge Richardson joined. Judge Motz wrote a dissenting opinion. ARGUED: Evelyn Rose Griggs Smallwood, HATCH ROCKERS IMMIGRATION, Durham, North Carolina, for Petitioner. Rachel Louise Browning, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Jessica E. Burns, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. 2 NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge: Katherin Mejia-Velasquez, a native and citizen of Honduras who entered the United States without inspection in February 2016, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Because Mejia-Velasquez failed to produce biometrics (such as her photograph, fingerprints, and signature) in support of her application, after having been warned of the consequences of failing to do so, the immigration judge (“IJ”) deemed her application abandoned pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.47(c) and 1208.10 and ordered her removed to Honduras. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed in a decision dismissing her appeal. In her petition for review, Mejia-Velasquez contends that the BIA’s decision should be vacated and her case remanded for consideration of her application on the merits. She argues mainly that she did not receive sufficient notice that she was required to provide biometrics, as specified in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(d), and that the BIA’s decision upholding the notice given in this case relied on its erroneous decision in Matter of D-M-C-P-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 644 (BIA 2015), which misinterpreted the regulation by eclipsing a portion of its requirements. Spelling out the distinction between what the decision in Matter of D-M- C-P- held § 1003.47(d) to require and what the regulation actually requires, she argues that Matter of D-M-C-P- should be given no deference, noting that § 1003.47(d) is unambiguous and, in any event, the decision is not a reasonable interpretation of the regulation. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415–16 (2019). Therefore, she concludes, the BIA erred in relying on Matter of D-M-C-P-. 3 While we agree with Mejia-Velasquez that Matter of D-M-C-P- is not entitled to Kisor deference, we conclude that the record demonstrates that she received notice that substantially complied with the requirements of § 1003.47(d). Accordingly, we affirm the BIA’s decision and deny her petition for review. We also deny her subsequent petition for review of the BIA’s refusal to grant her motion for reconsideration of its decision. I After Mejia-Velasquez entered the United States without inspection, she …
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