NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________ No. 18-1839 ___________ KELVIN RICARDO MOLINA MORILLO, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, Respondent ____________________________________ On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A044-132-975) Immigration Judge: Honorable Kuyomars Q. Golparvar ____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) October 12, 2018 Before: VANASKIE, COWEN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: October 17, 2018) ___________ OPINION * ___________ PER CURIAM Kelvin Ricardo Molina Morillo (“Molina”) petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which dismissed his appeal from an Immigration * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Judge’s (“IJ”) decision that found him removable and denied his applications for relief. We will deny the petition for review. I. Molina, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, entered the United States as a permanent resident at the age of six in 1993. In December 2015, he was convicted of possession of a forged instrument and bribery in violation of New York law. He was placed in removal proceedings and charged with being removable for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude, and for having been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in INA § 101(a)(43)(R) [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R)]. 1 A.R. 580. About a year later, an additional charge was lodged, noting that Molina had been convicted in November 2015 of possession of forged money orders in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 500, which constituted an aggravated felony as defined in INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)]. 2 A.R. 576. The IJ sustained the charges and informed Molina that he would be ineligible for most forms of relief because of his criminal convictions. A.R. 96-97. However, although the IJ determined that Molina had been convicted of an aggravated felony, he concluded that Molina’s crimes were not “particularly serious,” making him eligible to apply for withholding of removal, as well as protection under the Convention Against Torture 1 Subsection “R” defines an aggravated felony as “an offense relating to commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, or trafficking in vehicles the identification numbers of which have been altered for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year.” 2 Subsection “M(i)” defines an aggravated felony as “an offense that--(i) involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000.” 2 (“CAT”). A.R. 97. The IJ ultimately denied relief, however, because Molina had not met the high burden of showing that it was more likely than not that he would be persecuted based on a protected ground. 3 A.R. 105. The BIA agreed with the IJ that Molina’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 500 was an aggravated felony as defined in subsection (M)(i). A.R. 2. The BIA found it unnecessary to consider whether Molina had also been convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in subsection (R). Id. ...
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