NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED NOV 28 2018 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT KULDEEP SINGH, No. 16-73172 Petitioner, A205-585-737 v. MEMORANDUM* MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted November 15, 2018 San Francisco, California Before: SCHROEDER and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN,** District Judge. After arriving at a port of entry in the United States in 2013, Petitioner Kuldeep Singh (“Singh”) submitted applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Singh * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation. claimed he was fleeing violence inflicted by his uncle, a local leader of India’s Congress Party, because of Singh’s affiliation with the rival Mann Party. The Mann Party is a secessionist Sikh political party that advocates for the founding of Khalistan as a separate nation. The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Singh’s applications for relief after making an adverse credibility determination based on six inconsistencies in Singh’s testimony and documentary evidence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) adopted the IJ’s decision. Singh appeals, arguing that the record compels a reversal of his adverse credibility determination and that his claim for CAT protection should be remanded. We review factual findings, such as adverse credibility determinations, under a substantial evidence standard. Mejia–Paiz v. INS, 111 F.3d 720, 722 (9th Cir. 1997). “Even if we might have reached a conclusion different from that reached by the BIA, we may not reverse unless we determine that any reasonable factfinder would have been compelled to reach that conclusion.” Lolong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Because the BIA adopted the IJ’s decision in its entirety, we review the IJ decision as though it were the BIA’s decision. See Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994); Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). Under the REAL ID Act, an adverse credibility determination must be based on the totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Inconsistencies that form the basis of an adverse credibility determination need not “go[] to the heart” of petitioner’s claims. Id. Moreover, even before the REAL ID Act, applicable here, when inconsistencies had to “go to the heart” of the claim of persecution, we held that “[s]o long as one of the identified grounds is supported by substantial evidence . . . we are bound to accept the IJ's adverse credibility finding.” Wang v. INS, 352 F.3d 1250, 1259 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1046-48 (9th Cir. 2010). As a result, while the IJ focused on six inconsistencies, we need not discuss each of ...
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