16-3437-ag Kulmatov v. Whitaker UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 8th day of November two thousand eighteen. PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, ROBERT D. SACK, Circuit Judges, JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge.* ELDAR KULMATOV, VERA DERYABINA, Petitioners, 16-3437-ag v. MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, ACTING UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, * Judge John G. Koeltl, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. 1 Respondent.† FOR PETITIONERS: H. RAYMOND FASANO, Youman, Madeo & Fasano, LLP, New York, NY. FOR RESPONDENT: SHARON M. CLAY, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation (Chad E. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and Nancy Friedman, Senior Litigation Counsel, on the brief), Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Petition for review of a September 13, 2016 order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition be and hereby is DENIED. I. Petitioners Eldar Kulmatov (“Kulmatov”) and Vera Deryabina (jointly, “Petitioners”) petition for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing their appeal from an order of removal of an immigration judge. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. II. A. We review the BIA’s conclusions of law de novo and its findings of fact for substantial evidence. Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). Under the substantial-evidence standard, the BIA’s “findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). † Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Acting Attorney General Matthew G. Whitaker is automatically substituted for former Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions III, as Respondent. 2 B. 1. Petitioners argue that the BIA lacked substantial evidence for its determinations that Kulmatov had not suffered past persecution and did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his partial Uzbek ethnicity and was therefore ineligible for asylum. The BIA rested these determinations in part on a further determination that Petitioners had failed to prove that the government of Kyrgyzstan, the country from which Kulmatov originated, was ...
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