NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 22a0504n.06 No. 22-3141 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT LABORERS’ INTERNATIONAL ) FILED ) Dec 07, 2022 UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, Local ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk 894, ) Plaintiff, ) ) ALPHA SOUARE, ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR Plaintiff-Appellant, ) THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ) OHIO v. ) ) OPINION KENNY/OBAYASHI V, A Joint Venture; ) KENNY CONSTRUCTION COMPANY; ) OBAYASHI CORPORATION, ) ) Defendants-Appellees. ) Before: BOGGS, STRANCH, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges. JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Kenny Construction Company, Obayashi Corporation, and their unincorporated joint venture, Kenny/Obayashi V (collectively, “Kenny/Obayashi”), hired Alpha Souare, a Black man and Guinean immigrant, in early December 2017. He reported to the Ohio Canal Interceptor Tunnel Project in Akron, Ohio, where he worked for a single shift of construction work and was laid off, along with a group of other new employees that included white workers. Souare sued Kenny/Obayashi under Ohio law, alleging a claim for national origin discrimination and a claim for a hostile work environment based on race.1 The district court granted Kenny/Obayashi’s motion for summary judgment in full. Souare appeals. 1 The other plaintiffs initially named in the complaint, including Laborers’ International Union, Local 894, reached a settlement with Kenny/Obayashi, stipulated to dismissal of their claims with prejudice, and are no longer in the case. No. 22-3141, Laborers Int’l Union et al. v. Kenny/Obayashi, et al. Upon full review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we are not persuaded that the district court erred. Based on the thorough analysis of the district court, issuing a detailed opinion of this court would be duplicative and serve no useful purpose. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment and adopt the reasoning of its Memorandum of Opinion and Order dated January 31, 2022, with one exception. The district court did not fully address Souare’s argument that his discrimination claim could be proven with direct evidence. It held only that, “[a]bsent direct evidence of discrimination,” it “must employ the burden shifting framework established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).” But intentional discrimination can be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence, and “a plaintiff need only prove one or the other, not both.” See Hedrick v. W. Rsrv. Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 453 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Kline v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 348–49 (6th Cir. 1997)). We address here the statements that Souare identified on appeal and which he contends constitute direct evidence of national origin discrimination. We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Geiger v. Tower Auto., 579 F.3d 614, 620 (6th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one “that might affect the …
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