Case: 17-13940 Date Filed: 08/15/2018 Page: 1 of 10 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________ No. 17-13940 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________ D.C. Docket No. 0:14-cv-60306-MGC LAURA M. WATSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus FLORIDA JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS COMMISSION, RUBEN V. CHAVEZ, Co-Special Counsel to the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, in individual and official capacities, MAYANNE DOWNS, Member of the Hearing Panel of the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, in individual and official capacities, KERRY I. EVANDER, Chair of the Hearing Panel of the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, in individual and official capacities, THOMAS B. FREEMAN, Member of the Investigative Panel of the Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission, in individual and official capacities, in individual and official capacities, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Case: 17-13940 Date Filed: 08/15/2018 Page: 2 of 10 ________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________ (August 15, 2018) Before MARCUS, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Laura M. Watson, a former Florida circuit court judge proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal based on absolute and qualified immunity of her pro se second amended complaint raising civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) claim arising out of the Florida Judicial Qualification Commission’s (“JQC”) recommendation to the Florida Supreme Court that she be removed from the bench and her subsequent disbarment by The Florida Bar. She raised claims against 19 officials from the JQC and The Florida Bar (collectively, “the JQC and Bar Officials”) in their individual capacities. On appeal, Watson argues that the JQC and Bar Officials: (1) waived any absolute immunity defense by failing to raise it in an earlier appeal; (2) are not entitled to absolute immunity anyway because they would not have had immunity when the Civil Rights Act was passed in 1871; and (3) are not entitled to qualified immunity because they violated clearly established 2 Case: 17-13940 Date Filed: 08/15/2018 Page: 3 of 10 statutory and constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. I. Whether an official is entitled to absolute immunity is a question of law that we review de novo. Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293, 1301 (11th Cir. 2017). For the purpose of determining whether the defendants are entitled to absolute immunity, we accept as true the allegations of the complaint, along with any reasonable inference that may be drawn from them. Long v. Satz, 181 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999). We also review the dismissal of a complaint based on qualified immunity de novo. Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2003). Although the text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not explicitly provide immunity, the Supreme Court has reasoned that at the time Congress enacted § 1983, Congress meant to incorporate the common law immunities then available, or would have explicitly provided otherwise. Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999). Thus, determination of absolute immunity is not a ...
Original document
Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals