Lesly De Nankervis v. William Barr


NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 9 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT LESLY C. DE NANKERVIS, No. 17-71163 Petitioner, Agency No. A089-358-327 v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted November 13, 2019 San Francisco, California Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and TASHIMA and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges. Lesley De Nankervis petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision denying her motion to terminate removal proceedings and denying her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 1. De Nankervis contends that her removal proceedings should be terminated because the government coercively interrogated her and her minor daughters in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(vii). While the manner in which the two minor children in this case were interrogated is troubling, considering the totality of the circumstances, there is insufficient evidence to show that the government overstepped the bounds of § 287.8(c)(2)(vii). See Blanco v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 714, 721 (9th Cir. 2008); Bong Youn Choy v. Barber, 279 F.2d 642, 646– 47 (9th Cir. 1960). 2. The government did not violate 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(c) by failing to advise De Nankervis of her right to an attorney prior to interrogating her. Under our precedent, because De Nankervis had not yet been served with a Notice to Appear, the government was not required to advise her of her right to an attorney. See Samayoa-Martinez v. Holder, 558 F.3d 897, 901–02 (9th Cir. 2009). 3. Because of the lengthy history of De Nankervis’s removal proceedings, two different Immigration Judges (IJs) presided over different parts of her case. Although some of the first IJ’s actions at De Nankervis’s initial merits hearing raise concerns as to whether he improperly assisted the government’s case, these actions do not rise to the level of a due process violation. See Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971–72 (9th Cir. 2000); Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 1072 (9th Cir. 2003). On remand, a new IJ took over the case. As required by 8 C.F.R. 2 § 1240.1(b), the new IJ “familiarize[d] himself . . . with the record” and “state[d] for the record” that he had done so. Thus, neither of the IJs in this case violated the procedural protections afforded to De Nankervis by law. 4. An IJ has discretion to grant a motion for change of venue for good cause shown. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.20(b); Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89, 92 (9th Cir. 1988). An IJ abuses that discretion by denying a request to change venue when a venue change is necessary to “safeguard [the petitioner’s] right to a reasonable opportunity to be heard.” Campos ...

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