Lovepreet Singh v. Merrick Garland


FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 19 2021 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT LOVEPREET SINGH, No. 20-71802 Petitioner, Agency No. A215-680-087 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted November 17, 2021** San Francisco, California Before: SCHROEDER, W. FLETCHER, and MILLER, Circuit Judges. Lovepreet Singh seeks review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal from his final order of removal to India. The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied his application for asylum, withholding of * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) and we deny his petition for review. Singh argues that the BIA erred in dismissing his appeal because the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was not based upon substantial evidence in the record. Where, as here, the BIA reviewed the IJ’s credibility determination for clear error and relied upon the IJ’s opinion and statement of reasons, the court also looks to the IJ’s written decision as a guide to what lay behind the BIA’s conclusion. See Lai v. Holder, 773 F.3d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 2014). The agency’s factual findings “are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b)(4)(B). “[U]nder the REAL ID Act, credibility determinations are made—and must be reviewed—based on the ‘totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors,’ not a single factor.” Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (abrogating the Ninth Circuit’s single-factor rule for adverse credibility determinations). In assessing the “totality of the circumstances,” an IJ may rely on statutory factors, like “demeanor,” “candor,” “responsiveness,” “plausibility,” “inconsistency,” “inaccuracy,” and “falsehood,” as well as any other relevant factor. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). For each factor forming the basis of an adverse credibility determination, the IJ should refer to specific instances in the 2 record that support a conclusion that the factor undermines credibility. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010). An IJ may not selectively examine evidence, but rather must provide a “reasoned analysis of the evidence as a whole” to support an adverse credibility finding. Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 2010). There were three inconsistencies in Singh’s testimony upon which the IJ and BIA expressly relied in determining that he was not credible: (1) whether the timing of his promotion to Youth Leader occurred “shortly” after or three years after joining the Mann Party; (2) whether he ran away from his attackers prior to his 2017 assault or whether he conversed with them first; and (3) whether the name of the Mann Party …

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