NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _____________ No. 18-2120 ___________ LUIS ANDRES COELLO-UDIEL, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent _____________ On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency No. A043-172-142) Immigration Judge: Walter A. Durling ____________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) January 8, 2019 ______________ Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges (Filed February 5, 2019) ______________ OPINION* ______________ * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. Luis Andres Coello–Udiel petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the Immigration Judge’s denial of relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for review. I. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review We have jurisdiction to review final orders of the BIA under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), but because Coello–Udiel is subject to removal based on an aggravated felony conviction, that jurisdiction is limited to “constitutional claims or questions of law,” which we review de novo, and does not extend to factual or discretionary determinations. Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 515 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)–(D).1 Although we review the BIA’s decision, we also consider the IJ’s opinion where the BIA “has substantially relied on that opinion.” Camara v. Att’y Gen., 580 F.3d 196, 201 (3d Cir. 2009). II. Discussion Coello–Udiel argues that he was denied due process in his removal proceedings. In particular, he objects that the merits hearing was “incredibly short and fast,” Pet. Br. In this regard, the Government has moved to dismiss Coello–Udiel’s petition for 1 review for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that he has failed to raise a colorable constitutional or legal claim. While we conclude for the reasons below that Coello– Udiel’s claim ultimately fails on the merits, we do not consider it to be “immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction” or otherwise “wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 n.10 (2006)). 2 at 14, and asserts that the IJ did not give him an opportunity to address the IJ’s concerns before denying relief. The IJ erred, he contends, by “not asking more questions when [he] had concerns, providing [Coello–Udiel] the opportunity to further develop and clarify the [IJ’s] confusion regarding why [his supporting] facts are not speculative.” Pet. Br. at 18. Aliens facing removal are entitled to due process, Sewak v. INS, 900 F.2d 667, 671–72 (3d Cir. 1990), meaning “the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted). To ensure due process in removal proceedings, “[a]n alien: (1) is entitled to factfinding based on a record ...
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