FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 16 2020 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MANUEL DIAZ NAVARRO No. 18-72249 Petitioner, Agency No. 073-833-519 v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM BARR, Attorney General Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted January 6, 2020,** Pasadena, California Before: WATFORD and BENNETT, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,*** District Judge. Manuel Diaz Navarro petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the decision of an Immigration Judge (IJ) * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. denying his claims for asylum, for withholding of removal, and for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. The BIA’s determination that Diaz Navarro was not more likely than not to be tortured on return to Mexico, barring him from CAT relief, was supported by substantial evidence. Most importantly, Diaz Navarro has not demonstrated that he experienced relevant past torture, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)(i), the “principal factor” for determining whether future torture is likely. Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2015). Specifically, the BIA’s conclusion that Diaz Navarro did not experience past torture because he “did not sufficiently establish that his attackers were police or government actors,” represented a reasonable view of the facts given the threats Diaz Navarro received from cartel members and his own uncertainty about the identity of his attackers. As such, the BIA’s finding is binding on this panel. Yali Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Factual findings are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”). The BIA’s assessment of the remaining evidence of the likelihood of future torture was equally reasonable and based in the record. First, the BIA’s conclusion that any risk of future torture was mitigated by Diaz Navarro’s ability to relocate, 8 2 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)(ii), was rational based on his prior relocation to La Paz. Second, the BIA’s conclusion that the passage of time reduced the future risk of torture was reasonable given the likely impact nine years has had on his attackers’ continued interest in harming him. See Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 224–25 (BIA 2014). Consideration of the passage of time was appropriate under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3), which requires consideration of “all evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture.” Finally, the BIA’s conclusion that the State Department’s country conditions report could not save Diaz Navarro’s CAT application because it did not demonstrate a “particularized” threat to Diaz Navarro was reasonable. Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 922–23 (9th Cir. ...
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