NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 15 2021 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS MARCELINA CARRILLO PABLO, No. 18-71864 Petitioner, Agency No. A070-656-276 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted August 31, 2020** Seattle, Washington Before: BYBEE and COLLINS, Circuit Judges, and BASTIAN,*** District Judge. Guatemalan citizen Marcelina Carrillo Pablo petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the order of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her request for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“Torture Convention”) and ordering her removed. We have jurisdiction under § 242 of the Immigration and * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). *** The Honorable Stanley A. Bastian, Chief United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation. Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review the agency’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence. Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). A finding is supported by substantial evidence unless “‘any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary’ based on the evidence in the record.” Ai Jun Zhi v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). We deny the petition. 1. The agency properly concluded that Carrillo Pablo was ineligible for asylum because she failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A); see also id. § 1158(b)(1)(B). In contending that she established persecution on account of such a protected ground, Carrillo Pablo relies on her asserted membership in two “particular social group[s]” and on the asserted “political opinion[s]” imputed to her by her persecutors. The agency did not err in rejecting these claims. a. The agency properly concluded that Carrillo Pablo’s proposed social group of “married indigenous women whose husbands are absent” was not sufficiently particular and therefore not cognizable. To be sufficiently particular, a proposed social group must have “characteristics that ‘provide a clear benchmark for determining who falls within the group,’” meaning that “the relevant society 2 must have a ‘commonly accepted definition[]’ of the group.” Nguyen v. Barr, 983 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). “‘The group must also be discrete and have definable boundaries—it must not be amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.’” Id. (citation omitted). As the BIA recognized, Carrillo Pablo’s amorphously defined group could include “women whose husbands are absent either temporarily or permanently, and for any reason at all.” It could include widows and divorcées, as well as women whose husbands …
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