FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION FEB 28 2022 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MARIA HERNANDEZ-LOPEZ, AKA No. 19-70761 Juana Domingo Matias, Agency No. A200-048-337 Petitioner, v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted March 15, 2021** Submission Vacated March 18, 2021 Resubmitted February 28, 2022 San Francisco, California Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge, and LEFKOW,*** District Judge. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Joan H. Lefkow, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation. Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision denying her applications for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we grant in part and deny in part the petition for review. 1. Petitioner argues the BIA’s decision affirming the immigration judge’s (IJ) adverse credibility finding is not supported by substantial evidence. When “assessing an adverse credibility finding under the [REAL ID] Act, we must look to the ‘totality of circumstances[] and all relevant factors.’” Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). When applying this standard, “[t]here is no bright- line rule under which some number of inconsistencies requires sustaining or rejecting an adverse credibility determination.” Id. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s adverse credibility finding because (1) petitioner did not claim she feared returning to Guatemala during prior interactions with immigration officials; and (2) there were certain inconsistencies between petitioner’s testimony and her declaration. Regarding the second reason, petitioner testified that a man named David Gonzalez beat and raped her in a hotel room in 2002 and that she returned to the hotel where Gonzalez raped her on a weekly basis 2 for several months. In her declaration, petitioner described a single instance of rape in 2002 after which she did not see Gonzalez for “about a year.” When the IJ asked petitioner to clarify what she meant, petitioner said that Gonzalez raped her at a hotel in 2002, then raped her on a weekly basis, and then “[a]fter I was with him, he left, and I didn’t see him again.” The IJ then immediately moved on to a new subject. The difference between petitioner’s declaration and testimony may not have been trivial because it may amount to the difference between her suffering a pattern of rape over either several months or a single instance. See Zamanov v. Holder, 649 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[I]nconsistencies regarding events that form the basis of the asylum claim are sufficient to support …
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