Case: 18-60488 Document: 00515141867 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/02/2019 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit No. 18-60488 FILED Summary Calendar October 2, 2019 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk MARIA MAGDALENA MARROQUIN-ALMENGON, Petitioner v. WILLIAM P. BARR, U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals BIA No. A205 381 485 Before BENAVIDES, DENNIS, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Maria Magdalena Marroquin-Almengon, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing her appeal from the order of the Immigration Judge (IJ) denying her claims for asylum and withholding of removal. To the extent that the BIA relied upon the IJ’s decision, we may review the decisions of both the BIA and the IJ. See Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 2002). * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. Case: 18-60488 Document: 00515141867 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/02/2019 No. 18-60488 We review for substantial evidence the determination that Marroquin- Almengon is not credible, and we may not reverse unless the record evidence compels us to do so. See Wang v. Holder, 569 F.3d 531, 536-37 (5th Cir. 2009). The BIA “may rely on any inconsistency or omission in making an adverse credibility determination as long as the totality of the circumstances establishes that an asylum applicant is not credible.” Id. at 538 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As Marroquin-Almengon’s challenges to the adverse credibility determination are largely conclusory, and since she does not meaningfully address several of the inconsistencies cited by the BIA— including that her application for asylum and withholding of removal does not mention the sexual abuse and attempted rape described in her testimony—she fails to show that the adverse credibility finding is unsupported by substantial evidence. See id. at 536-37. Marroquin-Almengon next asserts that the IJ violated her due process rights. While we review de novo Marroquin-Almengon’s claim that the IJ violated her due process rights, she must show substantial prejudice in order to prevail. See Bouchikhi v. Holder, 676 F.3d 173, 180 (5th Cir. 2012). Citing, inter alia, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), and Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2011), Marroquin-Almengon argues that she did not receive sufficient notice that she would need to present corroborative evidence and that the IJ erred by failing to continue her hearing after the adverse credibility determination so that she would have the opportunity to collect and present such evidence. The BIA rejected Marroquin-Almengon’s argument, citing, inter alia, § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). Section 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) provides, in relevant part: In determining whether the applicant has met the applicant’s burden, the trier of fact may weigh the credible testimony along with other evidence of record. Where the trier of fact determines ...
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