Marina Butenko v. Matthew Whitaker


FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 17 2018 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MARINA V. BUTENKO, No. 16-72299 Petitioner, Agency No. A076-865-734 v. MEMORANDUM* MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted December 7, 2018 Seattle, Washington Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and McKEOWN and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges. Petitioner Marina Butenko, a citizen of Kyrgyzstan, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming an immigration judge’s denial of her motion to reopen her removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2), and we deny the petition for review. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Because the parties are familiar with the facts and the procedural history, we need not recount it here. We review the BIA’s determination that Butenko received sufficient notice de novo. Singh v. Gonzalez, 491 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2007). We review the BIA’s decision to deny Butenko’s motion to reopen based on exceptional circumstances for abuse of discretion. Singh v. INS, 295 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted). We may grant a petition for review of the BIA’s denial if it was “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Id. (internal citation omitted). We review the BIA’s decision to deny Butenko’s motion to reopen based on changed country conditions for abuse of discretion. Chandra v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2014). I The BIA did not err in concluding that an order granting the motion to reopen was not warranted due to a lack of notice for the prior in absentia removal proceeding. Due process is satisfied if notice was “reasonably calculated” to reach Butenko. Garcia v. INS, 222 F.3d 1208, 1209 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). Actual notice is not required. Farhoud v. INS, 122 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended (Oct. 6, 1997). The Immigration and Nationality Act provides for service by mail to the alien’s counsel of record. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(2)(A). “It is a longstanding principle that in ‘our system of representative litigation . . . each party 2 is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.’” Garcia, 222 F.3d at 1209 (quoting Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 634 (1962)). Service to Butenko’s attorney satisfied due process. Butenko’s declaration indicates that she traveled to the Ukraine in June of 2010, and that the abuse that prevented her from returning did not manifest until she began to prepare for her family’s return trip at the conclusion of their eighteen-day planned stay. Butenko did not inform her attorney of her travel plans, her declaration does not indicate that she was prohibited from contacting her attorney before or after the abuse ...

Original document
Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals