Marsha Vassell v. Robert Wilkinson


FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 8 2021 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MARSHA NATALIE VASSELL, AKA No. 17-71115 Charmaine Natalie Graham Vassell, AKA Marsha Richards, Agency No. A087-789-670 Petitioner, MEMORANDUM* v. ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted March 4, 2021** Seattle, Washington Before: RAWLINSON and BYBEE, Circuit Judges, and ENGLAND,*** Senior District Judge. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Morrison C. England, Jr., Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of California, sitting by designation. Petitioner Marsha Natalie Vassell (Vassell), a native and citizen of Jamaica, petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing her appeal of the immigration judge’s denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief pursuant to the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The BIA correctly held that Vassell’s guilty plea and conviction in 2004 for distribution of a controlled substance in violation of Md. Crim. Law § 5-602 was an aggravated drug felony rendering Vasell ineligible for asylum. See Dominguez v. Barr, 975 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2020), as amendded (explaining that a noncitizen “removable on aggravated felony grounds [is] ineligible for asylum and for cancellation of removal”) (citations omitted). Although Vassell contends that her suspended sentence and one year of supervised probation did not qualify as a conviction,“[a] sentence of probation, even with no incarceration, satisfies the requirements of [8 U.S.C.] § 1101(a)(48)(A) so long as the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the [noncitizen’s] liberty to be imposed.” Reyes v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). The BIA properly concluded that Vassell’s distribution of a controlled substance conviction qualified as an aggravated felony drug trafficking offense as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) because “it [was] a drug trafficking offense 2 that may be punished as a felony under federal law.” Md. Crim. Law § 5-602 (2004) provided that “a person may not: (1) manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled dangerous substance; or (2) possess a controlled dangerous substance in sufficient quantity reasonably to indicate under all circumstances an intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled dangerous substance.” Federal law similarly made it “unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally – (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or (2) to create, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or dispense, a counterfeit substance.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2004).1 “[W]e lack jurisdiction over the BIA’s determination that [Vassell] committed a particularly serious crime, retaining jurisdiction only to determine whether the BIA applied the proper legal standard.” Dominguez, …

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