Case: 16-16764 Date Filed: 09/25/2017 Page: 1 of 9 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________ No. 16-16764 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________ Agency No. A200-615-657 MAURICIO VILCHIZ-BELLO, Petitioner, versus U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. ________________________ Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals ________________________ (September 25, 2017) Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Case: 16-16764 Date Filed: 09/25/2017 Page: 2 of 9 Petitioner Mauricio Vilchiz-Bello, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review from the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) final order affirming the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”). On appeal, Petitioner argues that his conviction for criminal use of personal identification information under Florida Statute § 817.568(2)(a) does not categorically qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude. After careful review, we deny the petition for review. I. BACKGROUND Petitioner first entered the United States without admission or inspection in 1998. He departed the United States voluntarily in October 2010, but later re- entered in January 2011, again illegally, without being admitted or paroled. In April 2011, Petitioner was convicted in Arizona of solicitation to commit smuggling. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) subsequently issued Petitioner a notice to appear (“NTA”), charging him as removable (1) under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), for being present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, and (2) under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), because he was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. At a hearing before the IJ, Petitioner conceded removability as an alien present in the United States without admission or parole, but denied that he was removable for having committed a crime involving moral turpitude. Specifically, 2 Case: 16-16764 Date Filed: 09/25/2017 Page: 3 of 9 he contended that solicitation to commit alien smuggling is not a crime of moral turpitude. Petitioner later filed an application for withholding of removal. He also filed an application for cancellation of removal, asserting that his removal would cause exceptional hardship to his child, who is a United States citizen. In June 2014, and citing a second conviction, the DHS filed an additional charge of removability, again alleging that Petitioner was inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), as an alien who had committed a crime involving moral turpitude. In particular, the DHS alleged that Petitioner was convicted in November 2013 of criminal use of personal identification information, in violation of Florida Statute § 817.568(2), a third-degree felony. At a subsequent hearing before the IJ, Petitioner admitted that he was convicted of the above charge, but he contended that this conviction for criminal use of personal identification information was, like his other conviction, not a crime involving moral turpitude. Following the parties’ briefing on the issue, the IJ issued a written order sustaining the charge under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), based on Petitioner’s conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude. First, the IJ determined that Petitioner’s Arizona conviction for solicitation to commit smuggling did not qualify as a crime involving ...
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