NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 23a0243n.06 Case No. 22-3059 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED May 31, 2023 ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk MIGUEL CHIQUIRIN-DELGADO, ) Petitioner, ) ) ON PETITION FOR REVIEW v. ) FROM THE BOARD OF ) IMMIGRATION APPEALS MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, ) Respondent. ) OPINION ) Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; LARSEN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. SUTTON, Chief Judge. The Board of Immigration Appeals rejected Miguel Chiquirin- Delgado’s application for cancellation of removal. We deny his petition for review. Chiquirin entered the United States from Guatemala in 2002. He began to struggle with alcoholism. After he incurred several drunk-driving convictions and served time in jail, immigration authorities started removal proceedings. Chiquirin conceded his removability, and he applied for cancellation of removal based on hardship to his now seventeen-year-old daughter, Anabeti. Anabeti has suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and anxiety since Chiquirin spent time in jail. Chiquirin argued that her mental health conditions would worsen exponentially upon his removal. Unpersuaded, an immigration judge denied the application. The judge found Chiquirin ineligible for cancellation of removal because he did not establish continuous presence in the Case No. 22-3059, Chiquirin-Delgado v. Garland United States or exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to Anabeti. The judge alternatively denied cancellation as a matter of discretion in light of Chiquirin’s criminal record. For its part, the Board rejected Chiquirin’s appeal. It reasoned that Chiquirin had not shown the requisite hardship and that his drunk-driving convictions and other violations weighed against granting discretionary relief. Chiquirin challenges these conclusions on appeal. “The Attorney General may cancel removal” if a noncitizen establishes (1) continuous physical presence in the United States for 10 years, (2) “good moral character,” and (3) the absence of certain convictions, and shows (4) that removal would “result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying family member. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). But this showing “only gets a noncitizen so far,” Patel v. Garland, 142 S. Ct. 1614, 1619 (2022), because cancellation of removal remains discretionary in the end, Singh v. Rosen, 984 F.3d 1142, 1147 (6th Cir. 2021). The discretionary nature of this remedy hems in our authority. Hernandez v. Garland, 59 F.4th 762, 763 (6th Cir. 2023). We may review “constitutional claims or questions of law” implicated by the denial of cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). But we may not review “any judgment regarding the granting of relief under” the cancellation of removal statute, id. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), including underlying findings of fact, Patel, 142 S. Ct. at 1627, and other discretionary decisions made along the way, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). To stay within these guardrails, courts classify “the type of issue” raised in the petition for review, looking to its “substance” rather than “the name the immigrant places on it.” Singh, 984 F.3d at 1148–49. Two examples add definition to this line. One: legal questions and mixed questions of law and fact come within our authority, and we thus may review …
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