FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 14 2020 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MIGUEL ANGEL VELASCO-MARIN, No. 18-72279 Petitioner, Agency No. A200-147-933 v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted December 9, 2020** San Francisco, California Before: W. FLETCHER and IKUTA, Circuit Judges, and SCHREIER,*** District Judge. Miguel Angel Velasco Marin petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) holding that he is ineligible for cancellation of * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota, sitting by designation. removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b because he was convicted of an offense under § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) by violating a protection order. We deny the petition. 1. The Protection Order: To be eligible for cancellation of removal, an applicant must establish that he “has not been convicted of an offense under section . . . 1227(a)(2).” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C). Section 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) refers to an alien “whom the court determines has engaged in conduct that violates the portion of a protection order that involves protection against credible threats of violence.” (Emphasis added.) A “protection order” is “any injunction issued for the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts of domestic violence. . . .” Id. Velasco Marin argues that, rather than considering his conduct in analyzing whether his offense was described in § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii), the BIA should have used the modified categorical approach. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 200 (2013) (stating that, when a provision refers to what “the noncitizen was ‘convicted of,’ not what he did, . . . the inquiry in immigration proceedings is limited accordingly”); see also Alanis-Alvarado v. Holder, 558 F.3d 833, 836–37 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying the modified categorical approach to a conviction for violating a protection order in the cancellation context). Velasco Marin argues that Matter of Obshatko, 27 I. & N. Dec. 173 (BIA 2017), rejected the categorical approach only for the analysis of whether a violation of a protection order “renders an alien 2 removable,” and that the categorical approach still applies—as in Alanis- Alvarado—to the analysis of whether such a violation renders an alien ineligible for cancellation. Recent precedent forecloses this argument. In Matter of Medina-Jimenez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 399 (BIA 2018), the BIA extended Obshatko to the cancellation context. The BIA reasoned that it would be “incongruous” to apply the categorical approach here because § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) concerns “a court’s determination regarding an alien’s conduct.” Id. at 403. In Diaz-Quirazco v. Barr, 931 F.3d 830, 838–43 (9th Cir. 2019), we deferred to the Obshatko/Medina-Jimenez test. Because Diaz-Quirazco deferred to the BIA’s interpretation ...
Original document
Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals