UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA KYLE MILOWSKI, Plaintiff, v. No. 20-cv-2698 (DLF) ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION Kyle Milowski, proceeding pro se, brings this action against Alejandro Mayorkas in his official capacity as the Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security (“Department”),1 asserting claims under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791, et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112, et seq.; see Compl. at 3, Dkt. 1. Before the Court is the Department’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Transfer Venue, Dkt. 5. For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the Department’s motion to dismiss and grant its motion to transfer this case to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. 1 When this suit began, Chad Wolf was the Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. When Alejandro Mayorkas became the Secretary, he was automatically substituted as the proper defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background Milowski was employed by the Department of Homeland Security as a Deportation Officer and Course Developer Instructor at the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Training Academy. See EEOC Decision at 3, Dkt. 1-1. Milowski alleges that from January 2016 through February 2017, he suffered discrimination on account of his disability, was denied reasonable accommodations, and faced retaliation for seeking those accommodations. See Compl. at 4–5; EEOC Compl. at 1, Dkt. 5-5. Among other things, Milowski’s supervisor “made an unauthorized disclosure regarding [his] medical information,” and Milowski was denied “training consistent with his colleagues,” was assigned “collateral duties” in addition to his “primary duties,” and was “yelled at” by his supervisor shortly after he requested an accommodation. See EEOC Decision at 1–3. The EEOC affirmed the Department’s decision denying Milowski’s EEO complaint on June 18, 2020, see EEOC Decision at 14, 16, and Milowski filed this action on September 17, 2020, see Compl. Subsequently, the Department filed its motion to dismiss or transfer this case on the ground that venue was not proper in the District of Columbia. See Dkt. 5. That motion is now ripe for review. II. LEGAL STANDARDS Under Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to dismiss an action or claim when venue is improper. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). Similarly, the federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), requires a court to “dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer” a case that has been filed “in the wrong division or district.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). On a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, the moving party “must provide sufficient specificity to 2 put the plaintiff on notice of the [potential] defect,” but “the burden remains on the plaintiff to establish that venue is proper.” McCain v. Bank of Am., 13 F. Supp. 3d 45, 50–51 (D.D.C. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d sub nom. McCain v. …
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