18-2862-ag Mohammed v. Garland UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 23rd day of April, two thousand twenty-one. PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, JOSEPH F. BIANCO, Circuit Judges. ALHASSAN MOHAMMED, Petitioner, 18-2862-ag v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. FOR PETITIONER: Raymond Lo, Jersey City, NJ. FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Holly M. Smith, Senior Litigation Counsel; Christin M. Whitacre, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. Petitioner Alhassan Mohammed, a native and citizen of Ghana, seeks review of a September 14, 2018 decision of the BIA affirming a September 5, 2017 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Mohammed’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Mohammed, No. A 208 123 391 (B.I.A. Sept. 14, 2018), aff’g No. A 208 123 391 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Sept. 5, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. We review the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA—that is, without consideration of the IJ’s alternative burden holding that the BIA did not reach. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s . . . account, the consistency between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of such statements with other evidence of record . . . without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from …
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