(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2019 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus MONASKY v. TAGLIERI CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT No. 18–935. Argued December 11, 2019—Decided February 25, 2020 The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Ab- duction (Hague Convention or Convention), implemented in the United States by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U. S. C. §9001 et seq., provides that a child wrongfully removed from her country of “habitual residence” ordinarily must be returned to that country. Petitioner Monasky, a U. S. citizen, asserts that her Italian hus- band, respondent Taglieri, became abusive after the couple moved to Italy from the United States. Two months after the birth of the cou- ple’s daughter, A. M. T., in Italy, Monasky fled with the infant to Ohio. Taglieri petitioned the U. S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio for A. M. T.’s return to Italy under the Convention, pursuant to 22 U. S. C. §9003(b), on the ground that the child had been wrongfully removed from her country of “habitual residence.” The District Court granted Taglieri’s petition, concluding that the parents’ shared intent was for their daughter to live in Italy. Then two-year-old A. M. T. was returned to Italy. The en banc Sixth Circuit affirmed. Under its prec- edent, the court first noted, an infant’s habitual residence depends on the parents’ shared intent. It then reviewed the District Court’s habitual-residence determination for clear error and found none. In doing so, the court rejected Monasky’s argument that Italy could not qualify as A. M. T.’s “habitual residence” in the absence of an actual agreement by her parents to raise her there. Held: 1. A child’s habitual residence depends on the totality of the circum- stances specific to the case, not on categorical requirements such as an actual agreement between the parents. Pp. 7–14. (a) The inquiry begins with the Convention’s text “and the context 2 MONASKY v. TAGLIERI Syllabus in which the written words are used.” Air France v. Saks, 470 U. S. 392, 397. The Convention does not define “habitual residence,” but, as the Convention’s text and explanatory report indicate, a child habitu- ally resides where she is at home. This fact-driven inquiry must be “sensitive to the unique circumstances of the case and informed by common sense.” Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F. 3d 729, 744. Acclima- tion of older children and the intentions and circumstances of caregiv- ing parents are relevant considerations, but no single fact is dispositive across all cases. The treaty’s “negotiation and drafting ...
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