Moore v. Barr


19-2344-ag Moore v. Barr UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 30th day of June, two thousand twenty. PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., STEVEN J. MENASHI, Circuit Judges, STEVENSON RUBEN ONEAL MOORE, Petitioner, 19-2344-ag v. WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. FOR PETITIONER: RICHARD W. MARK (Julianne L. Duran, on the brief), Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, New York, NY. FOR RESPONDENT: ERICA B. MILES, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation (Lindsay B. Glauner, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation; Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Civil 1 Division, on the brief), U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Appeal from a July 12, 2019 order and a September 1, 2017 order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review be and hereby is DENIED. Petitioner Stevenson Ruben Oneal Moore (“Moore”), a native and citizen of Barbados, seeks review of the July 12, 2019, and September 1, 2017, decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming a March 15, 2017 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordering removal for a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”) and denying Moore’s applications for asylum and cancellation of removal. See In re Stevenson Ruben Oneal Moore, No. A041 731 144 (B.I.A. Jul. 12, 2019 & Sept. 1, 2017), aff’g No. A041 731 144 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Mar. 15, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions “for the sake of completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). Because Moore was found removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) for having been convicted of a CIMT, our appellate jurisdiction is limited to Moore’s constitutional claims and any questions of law arising from the decisions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D). Accordingly, we review de novo: (1) whether Moore’s “crime of conviction contains those elements which have been properly found to constitute a CIMT,” Gill v. INS, 420 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasis omitted); and (2) Moore’s due process challenge to the denial of his applications for asylum and cancellation of removal, see Gjerjaj v. Holder, 691 ...

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