FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 13 2020 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MYUNG NAM PARK, No. 17-71240 Petitioner, Agency No. A097-879-589 v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted February 13, 2020 Pasadena, California Before: SCHROEDER, BYBEE, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges. Petitioner Myung Nam Park, a native of North Korea and citizen of South Korea, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision affirming an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of Park’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not recite them here. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition for review. “Where, as here, the BIA cites [Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994)] and also provides its own review of the evidence and law, we review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions.” Ali v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2011). “We review denials of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief for substantial evidence and will uphold a denial supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Ling Huang v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). We must uphold a finding of fact unless “the evidence not only supports [a contrary] conclusion, but compels it.” Id. (alteration and emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 1. To establish eligibility for asylum, the petitioner bears the burden to show that he is unable or unwilling to return to his country of nationality “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). The petitioner can carry this burden in two ways. First, he can show that he suffered actual past persecution on account of a protected ground, which leads to a rebuttable presumption that his fear of future persecution is well- 2 founded. See Cordon-Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 2000). Second, he can show that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution that “is both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.” Lolong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, the agency found that Park showed neither actual past persecution nor a well-founded fear of future persecution. Both of these findings are supported by substantial evidence. The mistreatment Park experienced during his initial time in South Korea, while unpleasant, does not rise to the level of persecution. And the record does not compel us to reject the agency’s conclusion that, because Park faced a “low risk of persecution . . . by North ...
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