19-2630 Najera-Torres v. Garland BIA A096 182 709 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 9th day of March, two thousand twenty-two. PRESENT: DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge, SUSAN L. CARNEY, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ JENIE IVETH NAJERA-TORRES, Petitioner, v. 19-2630 NAC MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________ FOR PETITIONER: Weronika K. Costas, The Costas Network Law Center, LLC, Independence, OH. FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General; Shelley R. Goad, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation; Carmel A. Morgan, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC. UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. Petitioner Jenie Iveth Najera-Torres, a native and citizen of Honduras, seeks review of February 23, 2018 and July 24, 2019 decisions of the BIA, denying her second motion to reopen. In re Jenie Iveth Najera-Torres, No. A096 182 709 (B.I.A. Feb. 23, 2018 & July 24, 2019). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2008). In that context, the BIA abuses its discretion “only if the BIA's decision-making was arbitrary or capricious, as evidenced by a decision that provides no rational explanation for the agency's conclusion, 2 inexplicably departs from established policies, is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary or conclusory statements.” Id. at 169 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We review the agency’s findings of fact under the substantial evidence standard. Chen v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 502 F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2007). Under that standard, “administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Corovic v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 2008). In her motion to reopen, Najera-Torres asserted that domestic and gang violence had increased in Honduras, and that this circumstance excused the time and number limitations that otherwise barred her motion. She also asserted that these conditions demonstrated her prima facie eligibility for asylum and …
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