In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo No. 07-19-00361-CR NICHOLES CAMACHO, APPELLANT V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE On Appeal from the 140th District Court Lubbock County, Texas Trial Court No. 2019-418,183, Honorable Jim Bob Darnell, Presiding June 30, 2021 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ. Nicholes Camacho, appellant, appeals his conviction for sexual assault. He contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of extraneous offenses. We affirm. According to the record, the victim of the sexual assault was appellant’s girlfriend. Furthermore, appellant generally described the allegedly inadmissible extraneous offenses involved. They consisted of 1) appellant “assault[ing] her outside her work the night before the instant offense”; 2) appellant breaking “into the alleged victim’s home on May 3 (after the instant offense) chok[ing] and hit[ting] her and tr[ying] to sexually assault her again”; 3) “[t]he alleged victim’s tires [being] slashed at some point after the May 3rd event”; 4) “[t]he alleged victim’s mother’s tires were also slashed”; 5) appellant “threaten[ing] to alert the government that the alleged victim was an illegal immigrant”; 6) the victim “obtaining a protective order against Appellant”; 7) appellant being “arrested ‘lots of times’ for this conduct”; and 8) appellant “violat[ing] the protective order.” Below, and here, appellant argued that Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b) barred the admission of each. The standard of review is abused discretion. Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Madrid v. State, No. 07-08-0424-CR, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 7532, at *5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Sept. 28, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Under it, we cannot reverse a trial judge’s ruling that falls within the “‘zone of reasonable disagreement.’” Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Nor may we reverse one if the decision is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). This is true irrespective of whether the theory was raised at trial. See State v. Esparza, 413 S.W.3d 81, 86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Next, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure art. 38.371(a) states that “[t]his article applies to a proceeding in the prosecution of a defendant for an offense, or for an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense, for which the alleged victim is a person whose relationship to or association with the defendant is described by Section 71.0021(b), 71.003, or 71.005, Family Code.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.371(a) (West Supp. 2020). Subsection (b) of the same article provides: “[i]n the prosecution of an offense described by Subsection (a), subject to the Texas Rules of Evidence or other applicable 2 law, each party may offer testimony or other evidence of all relevant facts and circumstances that would assist the trier of fact in determining whether the actor committed the offense described by Subsection (a), including testimony or evidence regarding the nature of the relationship between the actor and the alleged victim.” Id. § …
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