Case: 19-11274 Date Filed: 12/19/2019 Page: 1 of 4 [DO NOT PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________ No. 19-11274 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________ Agency No. A094-376-744 NICOLAS CABALLERO-PINEDA, Petitioner, versus U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. ________________________ Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals ________________________ (December 19, 2019) Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Case: 19-11274 Date Filed: 12/19/2019 Page: 2 of 4 Nicolas Caballero-Pineda, a native and citizen of El Salvador, challenges whether the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) applied the appropriate legal standard in affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) discretionary denial of his application for special-rule cancellation of removal pursuant to the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (“NACARA”).1 Because we determine that the BIA applied the appropriate legal standard, we dismiss his petition. In its review, the BIA determined that the IJ erred by applying the incorrect hardship standard in evaluating Caballero-Pineda’s eligibility for NACARA relief, 2 a finding that neither party disputes. The BIA, however, affirmed the denial of NACARA relief based on its de novo review of the IJ’s decision. The BIA, like the IJ, was unpersuaded that Caballero-Pineda’s equities were outweighed by his lack of candor throughout the process and affirmed the IJ’s 1 The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s denial of Caballero-Pineda’s applications for cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture relief. Caballero-Pineda does not challenge those holdings in this appeal. 2 A NACARA cancellation applicant must prove that the applicant: “(1) is not inadmissible for having committed a crime of moral turpitude; (2) has been physically and continuously present in the United States for at least the seven years before applying for special- rule cancellation; (3) has been a person of good moral character during those seven years; and (4) establishes that removal would result in extreme hardship to the alien or to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen or legal permanent resident of the United States.” Jimenez- Galicia v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 690 F.3d 1207, 1208 n.1 (11th Cir. 2012). There is a rebuttable presumption that a NACARA cancellation applicant has satisfied the extreme hardship standard, which the IJ failed to apply. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.64(d)(1) (“An applicant . . . shall be presumed to have established that deportation or removal from the United States would result in extreme hardship to the applicant or to his or her spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.”). 2 Case: 19-11274 Date Filed: 12/19/2019 Page: 3 of 4 discretionary decision to deny relief. Caballero-Pineda argues that the BIA erred by affirming the IJ’s denial of his petition because the IJ did not deny his petition on discretionary grounds, but rather denied his petition based on a misapplication of the hardship standard. Before considering the merits of a petition, we “must first consider whether we have subject matter jurisdiction to ...
Original document
Source: All recent Immigration Decisions In All the U.S. Courts of Appeals