NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 31 2022 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT NIDIA GEORGINA AGUILAR RAMIREZ; No. 17-71060 JHONATAN ARIEL MIRANDA AGUILAR, Agency Nos. A208-123-050 A208-123-051 Petitioners, v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted August 29, 2022** Seattle, Washington Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges. Nidia Aguilar Ramirez seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision dismissing her appeal of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Torture (“CAT”), for herself and her son, Jhonatan Miranda Aguilar, as a derivative beneficiary. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). “When, like here, the BIA issues its own decision but adopts particular parts of the IJ’s reasoning,” Iman v. Barr, 972 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020), we review “the reasons explicitly identified by the BIA” and “the reasoning articulated in the IJ’s oral decision in support of those reasons,” Lai v. Holder, 773 F.3d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). We deny the petition for review. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that the harm Aguilar suffered did not rise to the level of past persecution. Aguilar described men following her and making sexually suggestive comments such as, “oh mommy, mamacita … sweet thing, where are you going? I wish I was the clothes that you’re wearing.” This harassing conduct was undoubtedly frightening, but it does not meet the high threshold of establishing past persecution. See Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2021) (defining “persecution” as “an extreme concept that means something considerably more than discrimination or harassment” (citation omitted)). None of Aguilar’s harassers made physical contact with her, nor did she endure “repeated, specific” threats. Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019). In sum, the record does not compel a result contrary to the agency. Likewise, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that, because Aguilar could reasonably relocate outside of her hometown in Mexico, she did not 2 meet her burden of establishing a well-founded fear of future persecution. Because the IJ found that Aguilar had not established past persecution, the burden remained on her to show “that it would not be reasonable … to relocate.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)(i). Nothing in the record compels us to conclude that the agency erred in finding that Aguilar had not met that burden. See Jiang v. Holder, 754 F.3d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 2014), overruled on other grounds by Alam v. Garland, 11 F.4th 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc). The BIA properly considered the relevant factors, including the absence of evidence that gang …
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