(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2018 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus NIELSEN, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL. v. PREAP ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 16–1363. Argued October 10, 2018—Decided March 19, 2019* Federal immigration law empowers the Secretary of Homeland Security to arrest and hold a deportable alien pending a removal decision, and generally gives the Secretary the discretion either to detain the alien or to release him on bond or parole. 8 U. S. C. §1226(a). Another provision, §1226(c)—enacted out of “concer[n] that deportable crimi- nal aliens who are not detained continue to engage in crime and fail to appear for their removal hearings,” Demore v. Kim, 538 U. S. 510, 513—sets out four categories of aliens who are inadmissible or de- portable for bearing certain links to terrorism or for committing spec- ified crimes. Section 1226(c)(1) directs the Secretary to arrest any such criminal alien “when the alien is released” from jail, and §1226(c)(2) forbids the Secretary to release any “alien described in paragraph (1)” pending a determination on removal (with one excep- tion not relevant here). Respondents, two classes of aliens detained under §1226(c)(2), al- lege that because they were not immediately detained by immigra- tion officials after their release from criminal custody, they are not aliens “described in paragraph (1),” even though all of them fall into at least one of the four categories covered by §§1226(c)(1)(A)–(D). Be- cause the Government must rely on §1226(a) for their detention, re- spondents argue, they are entitled to bond hearings to determine if they should be released pending a decision on their status. The Dis- trict Courts ruled for respondents, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. —————— * Together with Wilcox, Acting Field Office Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al. v. Khoury et al. (see this Court’s Rule 12.4), also on certiorari to the same court. 2 NIELSEN v. PREAP Syllabus Held: The judgments are reversed, and the cases are remanded. 831 F. 3d 1193 and 667 Fed. Appx. 966, reversed and remanded. JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III–A, III–B–1, and IV, concluding that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of §1226(c) is contrary to the plain text and structure of the statute. Pp. 10–17, 20–26. (a) The statute’s text does not support the argument that because respondents were not arrested immediately after their release, they are not “described in” §1226(c)(1). Since an adverb cannot modify a noun, §1226(c)(1)’s adverbial clause “when . . . released” does not modify the noun “alien,” ...
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