UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PERPOSE OSARO ONAGHISE, Plaintiff, v. Case No. 1:20-cv-01048(TNM) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al., Defendants. MEMORANDUM ORDER Plaintiff Perpose Osaro Onaghise seeks reversal of a decision denying his request for classification as an “alien with extraordinary ability.” Defendants move to transfer this case to the Northern District of Texas. For the following reasons, the Court will grant the motion. I. Onaghise resides in Nigeria. Am. Compl. ¶ 9, ECF No. 8. He filed a Form I-140 Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker (“I-140 petition”) requesting classification as an “alien with extraordinary ability.” Id. ¶ 14. After issuing a “Request for Evidence,” the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) denied Onaghise’s I-140 petition. Id. ¶ 20. He then sued in this District to challenge the denial of his I-140 petition under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Mandamus Act, and the Declaratory Judgment Act. Id. ¶ 1. He seeks an order setting aside that decision and approving the I-140 petition. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. Defendants are the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and several government officials sued in their official capacity: Chad Wolf, the Acting Secretary of DHS; Kenneth Cuccinelli, 1 1 Cuccinelli’s predecessor, Mark Koumans, was originally named as a Defendant but he is automatically substituted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 25(d). the Acting Director of the USCIS; and Gregory Richardson, the Director of the USCIS Texas Service Center (collectively, “the Government”). See id. ¶¶ 10–13. The Government now moves to transfer this case to the Northern District of Texas. II. The transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), allows a district court to “transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” In considering a motion to transfer, courts undertake a two-step process. First, the court determines whether venue is proper in the transferee court—the district where the case “might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). If it is, the court then weighs “a number of case-specific factors” to decide whether a transfer is warranted. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988). And the burden is on the party seeking a transfer. Aftab v. Gonzalez, 597 F. Supp. 2d 76, 79 (D.D.C. 2009). III. “Cases challenging the actions of local USCIS offices are frequently, and appropriately, transferred to the venue encompassing those local offices.” Bourdon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 235 F. Supp. 3d 298, 305 (D.D.C. 2017) (collecting cases). This is such a case. Both parties are better situated to litigate this action in the Northern District of Texas, where the events occurred. A. For starters, the Northern District of Texas can adjudicate this dispute. When a federal agency or official is the defendant, venue is proper in any judicial district in which “a defendant in the action resides” or where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1). These are independent bases for venue. And they ...
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