NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 21 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT OSTOJA KRSTIC, No. 18-71870 Petitioner, Agency No. A079-927-841 v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted March 6, 2020 Portland, Oregon Before: McKEOWN and PAEZ, Circuit Judges, and HUCK,** District Judge. Ostoja Krstic petitions for review of the Board of Immigrations Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order of removal. Krstic challenges the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) and BIA’s jurisdiction over his case; the adverse credibility finding; the determination that he was subject to the persecutor bar, inadmissible, and ineligible * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Paul C. Huck, United States District Judge for the U.S. District Court for Southern Florida, sitting by designation. for relief; and the termination of his asylee status. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. “On review from a decision to terminate asylum status, this Court reviews the BIA’s factual findings for substantial evidence. Questions of law are reviewed de novo.” Urooj v. Holder, 734 F.3d 1075, 1077–78 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). We review adverse credibility determinations for substantial evidence. Yeimane-Berhe v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 907, 910 (9th Cir. 2004). We deny the petition for review. 1. As an initial matter, the defective notice to appear, which lacked the date and time of the immigration hearing, did not deprive the IJ or BIA of jurisdiction. See Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 2019) (concluding that the IJ had jurisdiction where “the initial notice to appear d[id] not specify the time and date of the proceedings, but later notices of hearing include[d] that information”). Two days after Krstic was served with the defective notice to appear, he received a hearing notice specifying the date and time of his removal proceedings. Accordingly, we need not decide “whether jurisdiction would have vested if [he] had not received this information in a timely fashion.” Id. at 1162. 2. Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination. Because Krstic filed his first refugee application prior to May 11, 2005, the BIA and IJ properly evaluated his credibility under the pre-REAL ID Act standard. Under that standard, “the IJ must provide specific, cogent reasons for reaching an 2 adverse credibility determination, and minor inconsistencies or factual omissions that do not go to the heart of the asylum claim are insufficient to support it.” Singh v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Krstic’s “repeated[] and persistent[] lie[s] under oath with respect to his application for asylum” are sufficient to support the adverse credibility finding. Martinez v. Holder, 557 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1264, 1272 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[L]ies and fraudulent documents when they are no longer necessary for the immediate escape from ...
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