PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _______________ No. 17-2901 _______________ PABLO ANTONIO MEJIA-CASTANON, Petitioner v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA _______________ On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Agency Case No. A206-033-430) Immigration Judge: Honorable Steven A. Morley _______________ Argued: May 30, 2018 Before: AMBRO, SCIRICA, and SILER, JR., Circuit Judges. Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr., United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. (Opinion Filed: July 25, 2019) Theodore J. Murphy [ARGUED] Murphy Law Firm 320 North High Street West Chester, PA 19380 Counsel for Petitioner Chad A. Readler Anthony P. Nicastro Dana M. Camilleri Sabatino F. Leo [ARGUED] United States Department of Justice Office of Immigration Litigation P.O. Box 878 Ben Franklin Station Washington, DC 20044 Counsel for Respondent _______________ OPINION OF THE COURT _______________ SCIRICA, Circuit Judge Aliens who are unlawfully present in the United States and ordered removed may apply for cancellation of that removal if they, among other things, have maintained a continuous physical presence in the United States for at least ten years and have been a person of good moral character for such period. Congress modified the calculation of the physical presence requirement when it amended the Immigration and 2 Nationality Act in 1996: Under the “stop-time rule,” the physical presence period ends when the Department of Homeland Security serves the alien with a notice to appear.1 As a result, aliens cannot continue to accrue physical presence time during the pendency of (often lengthy) removal proceedings and appeals. At issue is whether the stop-time rule applies to the time period during which an alien must exhibit good moral character. Petitioner Pablo Antonio Mejia-Castanon maintains that it does, such that events occurring after the service of a notice to appear cannot be used to evaluate his good moral character. This time distinction is critical to Petitioner’s application for cancellation of removal because he admitted to helping family members illegally enter the United States during the pendency of his application, a transgression that indisputably undermines his ability to demonstrate good moral character. Under Petitioner’s interpretation, the stop-time rule operates to exclude these events from the evaluation of his moral character. But if the stop-time rule does not truncate the good moral character window, he will not satisfy the good moral character requirement and will be statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals rejected Petitioner’s reading of the statute, and two courts of appeals have deferred to the Board’s interpretation under Chevron. For 1 While this case was pending, the Supreme Court issued a decision clarifying what is required of such a notice to appear. See Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018). Pereira has important consequences for the stop-time rule, which we discuss below. See infra Section I.B.2. 3 the reasons that follow, we agree with our sister circuits and hold that the Board’s interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference. Under that ...
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