People of Michigan v. Boban Temelkoski

Order Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan January 24, 2018 Stephen J. Markman, Chief Justice 150643 & (145) Brian K. Zahra Bridget M. McCormack David F. Viviano Richard H. Bernstein Kurtis T. Wilder Elizabeth T. Clement, PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Justices Plaintiff-Appellee, v SC: 150643 COA: 313670 Wayne CC: 94-000424-FH BOBAN TEMELKOSKI, Defendant-Appellant. _________________________________________/ On order of the Court, leave to appeal having been granted and the briefs and oral arguments of the parties having been considered by the Court, we REVERSE the judgment of the Court of Appeals and REINSTATE the Wayne Circuit Court’s order removing defendant from the sex offender registry on the basis that requiring him to register violates due process. US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 17. On March 4, 1994, defendant pleaded guilty as charged to one count of second- degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of MCL 750.520c(1)(a) and was sentenced as a youthful trainee under the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act (HYTA), MCL 762.11 et seq., to a 3-year term of probation. HYTA provides that when a criminal defendant between the ages of 17 and 20 pleads guilty to certain crimes, a trial court may “without entering a judgment of conviction and with the consent of that individual, consider and assign that individual to the status of youthful trainee.” MCL 762.11(1). The statute in effect at the time of defendant’s plea further provided that “[a]n assignment of an individual to the status of youthful trainee as provided in this chapter is not a conviction for a crime, and the individual assigned to the status of youthful trainee shall not suffer a civil disability or loss of right or privilege following his or her release from that status because of his or her assignment as a youthful trainee.” MCL 762.14(2), as amended by 1993 PA 293 (emphasis added). Defendant does not claim that he was promised assignment as a youthful trainee in exchange for his guilty plea. Cf. Santobello v New York, 404 US 257, 262 (1971) (“[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.”). Rather, he claims that he was induced by HYTA to plead guilty because the statute offered him potential benefits for pleading guilty that he could not otherwise have obtained had he exercised his constitutional right to a trial. See generally Corbitt v New Jersey, 439 US 212 (1978) (implicitly recognizing that a statute alone can induce a plea). We believe that the Santobello principle applies with equal 2 force to a statutory provision, such as HYTA, that induces a defendant to plead guilty by offering him certain benefits if he does so and satisfies other statutory conditions. In this case, defendant was screened and presumably deemed eligible for youthful trainee status before entering his guilty plea, and thus it is clear that such a disposition was contemplated by the ...

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