Filed 11/22/22 P. v. Houseman CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento) ---- THE PEOPLE, C093921 Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 79293) v. RANDALL HOUSEMAN, Defendant and Appellant. Over 30 years ago, defendant Randall Houseman was convicted of two counts of murder after his accomplice killed two people during a burglary. The prosecution’s theory of murder was based on the former felony-murder rule, which provided that all participants in a burglary (and certain other crimes) are guilty of murder when one of them kills while acting in furtherance of the crime. That theory, although a valid theory at the time, is valid no more. Effective January 1, 2019, the California Legislature narrowed the felony-murder rule “to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” 1 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) It also, with the addition of Penal Code1 section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95),2 established a procedure for convicted murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief. In this appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his petition to vacate his murder convictions under section 1172.6. The trial court found defendant ineligible for relief because, after reviewing the evidence produced at trial, it found the evidence showed that defendant remained liable for the murders under two still-valid theories of murder. First, it found he remained liable for the murders because the evidence showed he was a major participant in the crime and acted with reckless indifference to human life. Second, it found he remained liable for the murders because the evidence showed he aided and abetted his accomplice with the intent to kill. Challenging the trial court’s findings, defendant asks us to independently evaluate whether his murder convictions should be set aside under section 1172.6. He further asks us to correct two alleged factual misstatements in his probation report. We affirm. Because defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s findings raises predominantly factual questions—including, for instance, whether defendant was a major participant in the crime and acted with reckless indifference to human life—we review these findings for substantial evidence. Applying that deferential standard here, rather than defendant’s preferred independent standard of review, we find the evidence sufficient to support the trial court’s findings that defendant was a major participant in the crime and acted with reckless indifference to human life. Because that is enough to sustain defendant’s murder convictions, we need not address the trial court’s additional ground for …
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