2019 IL App (2d) 160788 No. 2-16-0788 Opinion filed January 16, 2019 _____________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 13-CF-1779 ) KEVIN TUCEK, ) Honorable ) Mark A. Pheanis, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________ PRESIDING JUSTICE BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Zenoff and Schostok concurred in the judgment and opinion. OPINION ¶1 Defendant, Kevin Tucek, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)). Defendant’s petition did not show even the gist of a meritorious assertion that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s alleged defective performance. Thus, we affirm. ¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND ¶3 Defendant was charged with one count of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2012)), a Class X felony with a sentencing range of 6 to 60 years’ imprisonment (id. § 11-1.40(b)(1)). As amended, the indictment alleged that, “on or about 2019 IL App (2d) 160788 August 1, 2009[,] and March 1, 2012,” defendant inserted his finger into the vagina of H.T., who was under 13 years old at the time. ¶4 On January 17, 2014, the State filed a notice of its intent to introduce statements that H.T. made (see 725 ILCS 5/115-10 (West 2012)) on four separate occasions to four different people, including an investigator with the Kane County Children’s Advocacy Center and an investigator with the Du Page County Children’s Advocacy Center. On February 20, 2014, the State moved in limine to admit evidence that defendant had committed a separate illegal sexual act against H.T. (see id. § 115-7.3). The notice and the motion were not heard or ruled upon, as the parties reached a plea agreement. ¶5 On November 20, 2014, the parties presented the agreement. Defendant would plead guilty to criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(3) (West 2012)), a Class 1 felony (id. § 11-1.20(b)(1)) with a sentencing range of 4 to 15 years’ imprisonment (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-30(a) (West 2012)), and the State would recommend a sentence of 8 years, to run concurrently with defendant’s sentence in a Will County case. Defendant would be required for life to register as a sex offender (see 730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2012)). Also, after he finished his sentence, he would serve a term of mandatory supervised release (MSR) of no less than three years and as much as life (see 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(4) (West 2012)). ¶6 The trial court admonished defendant and asked him whether he understood the potential penalties, including MSR. Defendant said that he did and wished to persist in his plea. ¶7 The State presented the factual basis for the plea. Between August 1, 2009, and March 1, 2012, defendant and H.T. were residing with her mother. In interviews, H.T. stated the following. She was asleep in the living room ...
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