FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 09 2018 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT RAFAEL CARRASCO-IBARRA, No. 15-73012 Petitioner, Agency No. A019-982-046 v. MEMORANDUM* JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted April 10, 2018 San Francisco, California Before: D.W. NELSON, W. FLETCHER, and FISHER, Circuit Judges. Rafael Carrasco-Ibarra (“Petitioner”), a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision finding him inadmissible and statutorily ineligible for Registry under section 249 of the Immigration and * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Nationality Act (“Act”), 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (“Registry”). The BIA found Petitioner ineligible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E) due to “alien smuggling,” and also found that Petitioner failed to meet his burden of establishing the requisite continuous residence in the United States since his initial entry around 1966. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition. We review for substantial evidence whether a petitioner is statutorily eligible for Registry. Manzo-Fontes v. INS, 53 F.3d 280, 282 (9th Cir. 1995). We uphold the BIA’s findings if the decision is “supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Id. (citing INS v. Elias- Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)). Reversal is only appropriate if “the evidence in the record compels a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the [BIA’s] decision is incorrect.” Zhao v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir. 2008). Petitioner is statutorily ineligible for Registry because he is a “smuggler[] of aliens” under the statute, and he does not qualify for the family unity waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(11). Petitioner admitted to paying a smuggler to bring his wife and children to the United States. Petitioner’s wife and five of his six children had no immigration status at their time of entry. Despite this, Petitioner argues that he is eligible for Registry because: (1) he does not constitute a barred “smuggler” as intended by the statute, (2) the statute requires that disqualifying smuggling 2 offenses be committed within a reasonable period of time, and (3) his smuggling offense is subject to the family unity waiver. We conclude that each of these arguments is precluded by the plain language of the Registry statute. “In attempting to determine the meaning of a statute, ‘we look first to the plain meaning . . . and give effect to that meaning where fairly possible.’ ” Gomez–Lopez v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Lagandaon v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2004)). The Registry statute provides in relevant part: A record of lawful admission for permanent residence may, in the discretion of the Attorney General and under such regulations as he may ...
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