Ramon Calderon-Mejia v. William Barr


NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 21 2020 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT RAMON CALDERON-MEJIA, No. 19-72849 Petitioner, Agency No. A205-273-940 v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted December 10, 2020 Seattle, Washington Before: BERZON, MILLER, and BRESS, Circuit Judges. Ramon Calderon-Mejia, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming the denial of his applications for cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). We dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part. 1. The Board concluded that cancellation of removal was unwarranted * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. because the hardship that Mejia’s removal would cause his son, a United States citizen, did not “rise to the level of exceptional and extremely unusual.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). We lack jurisdiction to review the Board’s discretionary hardship determinations. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). Although we may entertain a claim that the Board applied the wrong legal standard, Alvarez Figueroa v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 487, 493–96 (9th Cir. 2008), it did not do so here. The Board appropriately considered the potential future hardship to Mejia’s son and concluded that there was no evidence that he would be unable to continue receiving medical treatment if Mejia were removed. The Board also recognized the “financial and emotional hardship” of family separation, but it concluded that Mejia’s removal was “the type of hardship common in families when a relative is [removed] and the qualifying relative remains in the United States.” See Cabrera- Alvarez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005). 2. Substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that Mejia’s asylum application was untimely. Asylum applications generally must be filed within one year of the applicant’s arrival in the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(2), but a late filing may be excused if the applicant demonstrates the existence of changed or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4)–(5). Mejia entered the United States in 2003 and did not file his application until 2016. His 2 limited English and lack of resources are not extraordinary circumstances. See Toj- Culpatan v. Holder, 612 F.3d 1088, 1090–91 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Neither is his unfamiliarity with asylum. See Antonio-Martinez v. INS, 317 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003). And to the extent Mejia argues that his sister’s beating in 2013 constituted changed circumstances that excused his late filing, a three-year delay after that event would still have been unreasonable. See Husyev v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 1172, 1181–82 (9th Cir. 2008). 3. The Board did not err in denying withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § ...

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