RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) File Name: 18a0272p.06 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT RAMON JASSO ARANGURE, ┐ Petitioner, │ │ > No. 18-3076 v. │ │ │ MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General, │ Respondent. │ ┘ On Petition for Review from the Board of Immigration Appeals; No. A 056 333 337. Argued: November 27, 2018 Decided and Filed: December 18, 2018 Before: THAPAR, BUSH, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges. _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Benjamin Casper Sanchez, Paul Dimick, Zachary Hofeld, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Petitioner. Song E. Park, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Benjamin Casper Sanchez, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, Minneapolis, Minnesota, Russell Abrutyn, ABRUTYN LAW, PLLC, Berkley, Michigan, for Petitioner. Song E. Park, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. Javier N. Maldonado, LAW OFFICE OF JAVIER N. MALDONADO, San Antonio, Texas, Khaled Alrabe, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, Boston, Massachusetts, for Amici Curiae. No. 18-3076 Jasso Arangure v. Whitaker Page 2 _________________ OPINION _________________ THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Courts have always had an “emphatic[]” duty “to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). But all too often, courts abdicate this duty by rushing to find statutes ambiguous, rather than performing a full interpretive analysis. When dealing with agencies, this abdication by ambiguity is even more tempting—and even more problematic. Because, under Chevron, ambiguity means courts get to outsource their “emphatic” duty by deferring to an agency’s interpretation. But even Chevron itself reminds courts that they must do their job before applying deference: they must first exhaust the “traditional tools” of statutory interpretation and “reject administrative constructions” that are contrary to the clear meaning of the statute. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984). First and foremost, this means courts must analyze the statutory text. But when the text standing alone does not supply an answer, courts must consider canons of interpretation. Here, a canon makes the statute’s meaning clear. Thus, we reject the agency’s contrary interpretation. I. In 2003, the United States granted Jasso lawful permanent resident status.1 Over a decade later, he pled guilty to first-degree home invasion in Michigan. See Mich. Comp. Laws (MCL) § 750.110a(2). Shortly thereafter, DHS began a removal proceeding. DHS argued that Jasso’s home-invasion conviction was a “crime of violence,” making him removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). At the time, the statute defined a “crime of violence” with both an elements clause and a residual clause. 18 U.S.C. § 16. The Immigration Judge found that Jasso’s home-invasion conviction was a crime of violence under the residual clause. Jasso appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”), but, in the interim, this court found the residual clause unconstitutionally vague. Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440, 446 (6th Cir. 2016). 1 In his brief, Ramon Jasso Arangure refers to himself ...
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